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AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF LABOR SUPPLY IN THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY
ABSTRACT
This paper uses micro data from a random survey carried out in the region
of Quebec City, Canada, to estimate a model of labor supply in the underground
economy. The model assumes that the individual's gross wage rate in the
regular sector is parametric while his gross labor earnings in the underground
sector are a concave function of hours of work. This distinction between the
two sectors is used to generate a simple separation result between preferences
and the magnitude of underground labor market activities. This result implies
that the individual's labor supply in the underground economy is generally a
negative function of his net wage rate in the regular sector. The separation
result also implies a set of restrictions on the parameters of the reduced form
of the model, which are imposed using minimum distance methods of estimation.
Various generalized method of moments specification tests allow us to verify
thevalidity of these restrictions.
According to our results, the marginal tax rates embodied in the Quebec
tax-transfer system are an important determinant of the decision to participate
in the underground sector.
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Most empirical work pertaining to the effects of the tax-transfer system
on individual choices in the labor market has focused on the work-leisure
choice (e.g. Hausman 1985).However other important decisions may be
affected as well.Thus, by driving a wedge between labor costs and net
returns to workers, a tax on labor income may stimulate tax evasion acti-
vities. Source withholding or information reporting requirements severely
limit opportunities of tax evasion in the regular sector.In contrast,
income from underground activities is administratively hard to detect since
no official records of these activities exist at all. As a consequence, the
decision to evade taxes on labor income is typically a decision to take one
or more jobs in the underground economy'.
While the theoretical literature on tax evasion with labor income has
expanded considerably over the past decade,2 empirical analyses are still
uncommon.Studies on tax evasion based on official audit samples provide
useful evidence on the impact of tax rates on tax evasion by type of income.3
However, information provided by these samples is often limited to regular
income underreporting. Moreover, they do not provide information on
individual wage rates and hours of work.It is therefore impossible to
estimate from those data sources distortions in the allocation of labor
resources between the regular and the underground economies.
On the other hand, there has been recent efforts in some European
countries to estimate labor supply functions in the underground economy based
on interview data.4To our knowledge, only Isachsen, Samuelsen and Strom
' In the sample used in this paper, only 17 percent of the individuals
who evaded taxes on labor income underreported their regular labor income (if
any) to the government authorities.
2 For example, Ealdry 1979, Pencavel 1979, Sandmo 1981, Cowell 1985,
Watson 1985, and Fluet 1987.
See, for example, Clotfelter 1983, Slemrod 1985 and Alexander and
Feinstein 1987.
See Pestieau (1985) and Cinsburgh, Perelman and Pestieau (1987) for
Belgium, Isachsen, Samuelsen and Strom (1985) for Norway and Van Eck and
Kazemier (1988) for the Netherlands.2
(1985) derived their empirical model from a full-fledged choice- theoretic
approach.It is estimated through maximizing a likelihood function which
takes into account various corner solutions.They found that marginal tax
rates positively influence labor supply in the underground sector while tax
enforcement variables have a negative impact. However, they assume away any
substitution between the regular and the underground economies, since gross
regular labor income is an exogenous variable in their model.
In this paper, we develop and estimate a model of labor supply in the
underground economy which allows for substitution between the regular and the
underground sectors.For this purpose, we use a random survey of 2134
adults living in the Census Metropolitan Area of Quebec City, conducted in
1986 by two authors of this paper (see Fortin and Fréchette (1987)).
Our theoretical model adds the features of a standard tax evasion
approach to the standard framework developed by Gronau (1977) to analyze the
allocation of time among leisure, work in the regular market, and work at
home. In our model, however, this latter variable becomes time allocated in
the underground sector:One crucial feature of Gronau's model is that
marginal returns from home production are a decreasing function of hours
worked at home.For two main reasons, that feature of returns to home
production is also likely to characterize labor earnings in the underground
sector.First, the underground labor markets are typically likely to be
small, to minimize the probability of detection by the tax authorities.
Furthermore, the absence of formal warranties for goods and services produced
in the underground economy limits the substitutability between these goods
and services and those produced in the regular economy (Cowell and Cordon
1989).Thus, the underground wage is not likely to be parametric and the
worker faces a demand curve instead.Labor earnings in the underground3
economy will therefore typically be a concave function of the amount of hours
worked5.
Another explanation for the concavity of the underground earnings
function has been proposed by Usher (1986). He argues that the marginal cost
of resources used by the agent to hide earnings to the tax authorities is
likely to increase with the level of those earnings. Under this assumption,
the underground earnings net of these costs will be a concave function of
hours of work in the underground economy, even if gross hourly earnings are
constant.
The remainder of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we describe
how the data set was collected and its main characteristics. In Section 3,
we present the model retained for the empirical analysis. In Section 4,the
stochastic specification of the model is outlined and the econometric
strategy is discussed. Participation and hours of work decisions are
estimated using two-step methods to adjust for selectivity, while restric-
tions of the model are imposed on the estimated reduced forms using minimum
distancetechniques. In Section 5, the empirical results are presented and
various specification tests are performed. We conclude the paper in Section
6.
2.The Data
The survey used in this paper was conducted during the Spring 1986. The
questionnaires were distributed by a group of trained interviewers who
stressed the anonymous and confidential character of the survey, as well as
Under the assumptions that a worker faces a linear demand, that there
are constant returns to scale in production, and that there is no price
discrimination, the underground earnings function will be globally concave
(see Cowell and Gordon (1989) for a model which retains these assumptions).
When the demand curve is non-linear but cuts each axis at some point, the
earnings function will be at least locally concave. In this case, i.t is easy
to show, using our framework, that the optimal solution for an individual
working in both the regular and the irregular sector will always fall in a
concave region of the earnings function. Note also that under perfect price
discrimination, this function will be globally concave as long as the demand
curve is negatively sloped.4
its scientific purposes.The respondents were asked to put the filled-in
questionnaire in a sealed envelope which was picked up a few days later by
the interviewer.
The main sample is of the random cluster type and is restricted to
household members over 18 years of age. The main sample was supplemented by
a small quota sample to compensate for the difficulties encountered in
reaching people in some areas or in some socio-econoinic groups through
household visits. 63.8 percent of the sampled households had at least one
individual answer the questionnaire.Moreover, in these respondent house-
holds, 81.1% of the members over 18 years of age answered the questionnaire.
Table 1 summarizes the socio-economic characteristics of the sample and
the magnitude of labor market activities in the underground sector. These
activities are defined as the set of all paid activities that are not
reported to the tax authorities. A sample of 2107 persons (of whom 285 from
the quota sample) is usable for our analysis.183 persons (or 8.7% of the
sample) report that they worked in the underground economy, for an average of
360 hours a year per person.Their average underground income was $2,171
(Canadian) in 1985.Males, youth, and unmarried people are more likely to
work in the underground sector than their counterparts. Furthermore, 28.6%
of the people who report that being in school or on unemployment was their
main labor market status during the year participated in the underground
sector5. The participation rate rises to 35% in the case of welfare
recipients.
The effect of education on the participation rate in the underground
sector is more ambiguous:it reaches a maximum for the category some
college and then goes down. This may reflect cohort effects as young people
in Quebec are more educated than their elders. Table 1 also shows that the
probability of participating and the number of hours worked in the under-
ground economy are inversely related to labor income in the regular sector.
The labor market status reported in Table 1 is the activity among
work, school, unemployment, housework, or retirement, on which the individual
spent the most weeks during the year. Someone who worked during 27 weeks and
was unemployed during 25 weeks is thus classified as a worker.5
The bottom part of Table 1 provides information on the industrial
composition of jobs in the underground economy.It should first be noted
that the probability of working in the underground economy is higher for
workers with a regular sector job in primary industries or in the construct-
ion industry.Furthermore, the jobs in the underground sector are con-
centrated in the construction industry and in services, which include
repairs.An interesting fact is that for most people working in both the
regular and the underground sector, the jobs in the two economies are in
different industries.
Further insight on the nature of the regular and of the underground
economies is provided by the sample covariance matrix of hours, earnings, and
wage (all expressed in logs) presented in Table 2. The table also presents
the partial covariance matrix of the same variables, partialling out for
standard control variables7. A first observation is that the variance of
annual hours of work in the underground sector is approximately three times
bigger than the same variance in the regular sector.This provides some
support to the hypothesis that the underground sector allows for more
"flexibility" than the regular sector in the choice of hours of work.
A second striking result that emerges from Table 2 is that in the
underground sector, both the covariance and the partial covariance between
hours of work and the wage rate is negative, while it is positive in the
regular sector. Such a result is a little puzzling as it does not fit with a
labor-leisure theoretic framework in any obvious manner8.
Any reasonable model of labor supply in the underground sector should be
able to explain this puzzle. The approach we will follow uses the concavity
of the function relating underground earnings to underground hours of work to
explain such a result. To illustrate that point, consider an unobservable
In Table 2, the control variables used are a dummy variable for sex,
number of years of education, number of years of experience in the regular
market, and its square.
8Theresult is quite robust to the choice of control variables and to
thesubsample used.In particular,it holds over the subsample of people
working in both the regular and the underground economies.6
factor, such as the moral attitude toward work in the underground sector,
that influences the choice of hours supplied in this sector. Assume further
that this factor does not affect the underground earnings function. Due to
the concavity of this function, the individuals who work more hours in the
underground sector will receive, ceteris paribus, a lower level of average
hourly earnings than those who work less hours.This fact will tend to
generate a negative correlation between hours of work and the average wage
rate in the underground sector.
In fact, Table 2 also provides some information on the concavity of the
earning functions in both the regular and the underground sector.Recall
that the regression coefficient of a variable Y on a variable X, controlling
for a set of variables Z can be written as c7xyi/axz, where is the
partial covariance between i and j, partialling out for Z.From this
result, one can easily compute estimates of the elasticity of earnings with
respect to hours of work in each sector.In the regular sector, this
elasticity ranges from 1.07 to 1.28, depending on whether the partial or the
raw covariances are used. On the other hand, it ranges from .73 to .74 in
the underground sector. This suggests that the earnings function is close to
linear in the regulat sector, at least when partial covariances are consi-
dered, while it is concave in the underground sector.Therefore, a model
which retains these features seems to be appealing not only for theoretical
but also for empirical reasons.
3.The Model
Following the basic model of tax evasion with labor income, the tax
evader faces two possible states of nature: either he gets caught working in
the underground sector (with probability P) or does not (with probability
l-P).In this simplest version of the model, P is assumed to be exogenous.
Getting caught entails a penalty proportional to the amount of tax evaded9.
Assuming, for the moment, a proportional income taxatrate r, the penalty
rate on underground income can be written as Ar, A being the penalty rate on
evaded tax (with A￿1). The expected rate of tax penalty, PAr, on evaded
This formulation was first proposed by Yitzhaki (1974).7
income is assumed to be less than the rate of taxr onreported income, i.e.
PA<l. The stochastic budget constraint faced by the individual is given by:
(1) X —W0(l—r)H0+f(H1)(l—DAr)+I
where: W0 : gross wage rate in the regular sector
H0 : hours of work in the regular sector
H1 : hours of work in the underground sector
1 with probability P
D : dummy variable —j
0 with probability 1—P
I : nonlabor income (including any lump-sum transfers)
X : consumption (the numéraire).
Following our discussion above, f(H1) represents an underground earnings
function a la Gronau, with f(0)—0, f'(H1)>O, and f"(H1)￿O.
We assume that the individual is an amoral expected utility maximizer,
and that utility has consumption and total hours of work as arguments. Thus,
the problem to be solved by the individual is:
(2) MaxE(U(H0 +H1,X)]
(H0, H1)
subject to (1) and to the non-negativity constraints on H0 and H1.The
utility function U(.) is assumed to be decreasing with H0+H1, increasing with
X, and to be a concave (but not necessarily strictly concave) function of its
arguments.
Now, consider the following assumptions:
A:theMwage rate" in the underground sector is parametric with
respect to hours, i.e. f'(H1)—W1 for all H1, and therefore f"(H1)—0.
: The underground earning function is strictly concave, that is
f"(H1)<O.
8li:U(.)is strictly concave, which implies that the individual is
risk-averse.8
Z: The individual is risk-neutral with respect to consumption, i.e.
there exists an affine transformation of the utility function such that
tJ(H0 +H1,C) —V(H0+H,)C.
The case where Ala and A2a are satisfied has been analyzed by several
authors10. Unfortunately, this leads to few interesting comparative statics
results, even with strong restrictions on preferences for consumption and
leisure''.As noted by Cowell (1985, p. 21), the basic reason for these
ambiguities is that "in reaction to any perturbation, the individual can
substitute across two margins (risk/no risk and labor/leisure), so that in
principle all sorts of behavior could be consistent with rational expected
utility maximization"12.In this branch of the literature, risk aversion
provides the "smoothness" required for interior solutions.Risk neutral
agents would specialize in only one sector with probability one.
An alternative approach, which we employ in this paper, consists of
assuming Alb and A2b; i.e., that the individual is risk-neutral and that the
function f(H,) representing his opportunities in the underground sector is
strictly concave. Under the latter assumption, risk aversion is no longer
required for the existence of interior solutions. This approach is closely
related to those recently adopted by authors dissatisfied with the lack of
predictive power of models based on risk aversion.13 Under assumptions Alb
and A2b, the first-order conditions for interior solutions imply:
10See,for example, Sandmo (1981), Cowell (1985), and Fluet (1987).
For a critical analysis of this approach, see Kesselman (1989).
12However,Fluet (1987) has shown that under the assumption that
W1<W0,therenecessarily exists a threshold tax rate above which there exists
a positive relationship between the tax rate and labor supply in the
irregular sector. Fluet assumes that the degree of absolute risk aversion is
decreasing in consumption and that there is an interior solution for H0 and
H1.
'Examplesof models of tax evasion that do not assume risk aversion
are Hansson (1985), Usher (1986), and Kessetman (1989). These models suppose
that tax evasion activities are full-proof (i.e. no chance of being detected)
but entail real or psychic costs.9
(3) W0(l—r) —f'(H1)(l—PAr)
Equation (3) means that, at the optimum, the marginal earnings from an
hour of work in the underground sector net of the expected marginalpenalty
is equal to the net wage rate in the regular sector.Note that PAr is
smaller than one for r￿l, since it was assumed that PA<l. (3) can be solved
for the labor supply in the underground sector:
W0 (l—r)
(3)' H1 —H1 ,withH(.) < 0
1—PAr
It is easy to verify that H1 is increasing with r while it is decreas-
ing with PA and W0, which is what one should intuitively expect.Further-
more, even in the absence of any tax illusion, the elasticity of H1 with
respect to the gross wage rate in the regular sector, W0, will be higher (in
absolute value) than the elasticity of H1 with respect to (l—r). This is the
case, since an increase in the tax rate also raises the expected penalty
rate, PAr, on underground earnings.
This model also provides a useful "separation theorem" for the choice of
hours of work in the underground sector.The point is that, under risk
neutrality assumption, hours worked in the underground sector do not depend
on preferences (see eq. 3). This result will be very important for the rest
of the paper: it means that the only way preferences can affect the choice of
hours in the underground sector is through the marginal tax rate which
depends indirectly on the number of hours worked in the regular sector. In
other words, the separation result provides a number of overidentification
restrictions that can help to identify the effect of the marginal tax rate on
underground labor supply, and that can be tested.
Until now, it was assumed that the individual was working in both
sectors at the optimum.Under the assumption that the individual works in
the regular sector and that, following Cogan (1980). he must entail a fixed
cost of C dollars to participate in the underground sector, the condition10
that deteruiines whether hours in the underground sector are positive or or
not is'4
(4) H
where H denotes the desired hours of work in the underground sector and
denotes the reservation hours in the underground sector. H' is the solution
to the following equation:
(5) f(H) -C—
Equation(5) means that, at the reservation hours H', the net expected
earnings [f(H)—C](1—PAr) in the underground sector are just equal to what
an individual workingH0 —H'at the net critical wage rate given by
W(l—r) —f'(H)(1—PAr)would earn in the regular sector.Figure 1 illus-
trates how H is determined.
Figure 1 also illustrates the impact of a change in the tax rate on
hours of work in the underground and in the regular sector, conditional on
participating in both sectors.The effect of an increase in the tax rate
from to on the hours worked in the underground sector is unambiguously
positive (from A to B). On the other hand, its effect on total hours of work
H.1.(C to D) is ambiguous in general, since it depends on substitution and
income effects which work in opposite directions15.
When the individual does not work in the regular sector, the
decisions on whether to participate and on how many hours to work in the
underground sector both depend on preferences. As a consequence, the separa-
tion result does not hold. It is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate
a model taking account of this possibility. SeeLemieux(1989) for a model
that endogenizes the participation decisions in both sectors.
15Underthe assumption that leisure is a normal good.11
4.Estimation Strategy
4.1 Stochastic specification
The last step before the model can be directly confronted with the data
consists in building a full stochastic specification and making some specific
functional form assumptions. Given the presence of corner solutions, it is
natural to formulate the model using a latent variables framework.To
simplify the derivations, we will first consider the case where the gross
wage rate in the regular sector and the marginal tax rate are assumed to be
exogenous. We will later show how these assumptions can be relaxed.
The first fundamental stochastic equation of the model specifies the
latent earnings function of the individual i in the underground sector:
(6) Y —f(Hi) —EXP(8.En(H) ++ x81 + c7)
where: Y :potential (or latent) earnings in the underground
sector.
x1: exogenous variables affecting the productivity
in the underground sector.
a random error term which reflects the effects of
unobservable variables affecting the productivity in
the underground sector.
Equation (6) is a simple Cobb-Douglas earnings function that is strictly
concave provided that 0 < 9 < 1.16
The equation for is obtained from the first-order condition (3).
Using (6), it can be rewritten as
16 The Cobb-Douglas specificationcan be interpreted as a (first-order)
approximation of any well-behaved earnings function. with this functional
form, the reduced form of our model is linear in its unrestricted parameters.
This greatly simplifies the computation of our minimum distance estimator.12
W0 (l—r)eChi
(7) f(H) —9H1 EXP (eln(H;1)+p0+x1fl1÷c71) —
1—PAr1
where h1 is an optimization error. An alternative interpretation of c is
that it reflects unobservable hours rationing in the regular and the
underground sectors. 17
Furthermore, with our Cobb-Douglas specification, the reservation hours
equation (5) becomes:
(8) (1-9) EXP (9ln(H'1) + + x1fl1 + c71) —C1
Finally, it is assumed that the fixed costs of working in the under-
ground sector (in log) is a linear function of a vector of explanatory
variables x and of an error term Cd
(9)C —EXP(60+ Xi&i + c)
Substituting (9) into (8) and taking the logs of (6), (7), and (8)
yield the structural form of our model:
(6)' ln(Y1) —9ln(H1) + + x1,81 +
-].n(W01(l—r1)) ln(l—PAr1)ln9 Px1$1
(7)' ln(H1)— + +—+—+ +
1—9 1—, 1—9 1—9 1—9 1—9
6o ln(1—8)Xc161x181 CcjCyj (8)' 1n(H1) — — + — +
9 9 8 9 8
£yj
where c x, x has aean zero and variance E.
cci
17Aslong as the level of this rationing is not correlated with the
independent variables, this will not affect the consistency property of the
estimators.13
Moreover, the relationship between the observed and the latent variables
is given by:
— Yand H11 —H1 ifln H(1) > ln (H)
(9)
IY11—0 and H11 —0 otherwise
Oneproblemwith (7)' is that we do not have any direct information on
the expected penalty rate PA on evaded taxes. However, consider the simple
case where PA is a constant (and is the same for everybody). Then PA can be
treated as a parameter to be estimated in equation (7)'. The only complica-
tion occurs because PA enters in (7)' in a non-linear fashion, through the
expression ln(l—PAr1). We have therefore dec.lded to use the following
first-order approximation of ln(l—PAr1):18










Using (10), it follows that (7)' can be rewritten as:
-ln(W01) (1—a1)ln(l—r1) 1n8 fl0i-a,xfl1 Cyi+Chi (7)" lnoi;1) —_______ — +—+ + +
1—9 1—8 1—6 1—9 1—6 1—6
'Equation(10) is obtained by redefining ln(l—PAr1) as
ln(l—PA(l—exp(x1)), with x1 —ln(1—r1),and taking the first-order Taylor
series expansion of this function of x around x0 —ln(l—r).14
One fundamental econometric problem that our estimation method will try
to address is the endogeneity of some of the regressors in equation (6)' and
(7)". Concerning the underground earnings equation (6)', it should be clear
that, as equation (7)" shows, underground hours will be correlated with the
error term That problem can be easily resolved by substituting (7)"
into (6)' ,whichyields'9:
-9ln(W01) 8(l—cx,)ln(l—r) Bln(9)x1 tyl±O(hl
(6)" ln(Y,) —________ — + + + +
1—9 1—9 1—9 1—9 1—9 1—0
A second problem is that the regular wage rate might also be endogenous.
To illustrate this point, consider the following Mincer-type specification
for the regular wage:
(11) ln(W0) —+x1-y1 +
where x0 is a standard set of human capital variables such as education,
experience, etc..The problem is that c might very well be correlated
with Forexample, if, after controlling for observable characteris-
tics, the individuals who are more productive in the regular sector are also
more productive in the underground sector, the OLS estimates of (6)" or (7)"
will be inconsistent. The standard remedy for such problem is to construct
an instrument for the regular wage.In the context of equations (6)", (7)"
and (11). the structural parameters a, 9, andwill be identified if some
observable variables (instrumental variables) affect the regular wage without
Note that the as, the fls and S can still be identified in (6)" since
x1 is associated with the same vector of parameters $inboth (6)' and (7)".
20 Alternatively, (11) could be replaced by a hedonicwage equation in
which the regular wage would depend on the number of hours worked in the
regular sector (see Rosen 1976). Consistent estimates of a, 8 and ficould
still be obtained using I.V. methods. In other words, the model does not
crucially rely on the linearity of the labor income function in the regular
sector.15
affecting the underground earnings function. In other words, it is necessary
to have at least one variable in x not included in x121.
Several variables potentially satisfy that condition. First, the union
status in the regular sector would be an ideal instrumental variable if union
workers were not also more productive than their non-unionized counterparts.
The point is that the union wage differential would then raise the regular
sector wage without affecting the the underground earnings function, since it
is uncorrelated with c. The union status would thus fulfill the two
conditions for being a good instrumental variable.The question of whether
union workers are more productive than their nonunion counterparts is,
however, still an unresolved issue in the literature (see Lewis (1986)).
Second, dummies for the industry in the regular sector could also be a
good set of instrumental variables because of inter-industry wage differen-
tials unexplained by differences in workers' productivity.In that sense,
industry dummies would play a role very similar to the union status in the
identification of the model.
One could argue, however, that the industry in which an individual works
in the regular sector affects the number of hours he works in the underground
sector because of the different constraints on hours worked for each industry
in the regular 'markets.Under that interpretation, the underground sector
acts as a labor market opportunity of the last resort for people who cannot
work as much as they would like in the regular sector. We attempt to handle
that problem by including in the underground hours equation a measure of
"excess employment" in the regular sector industry estimated from aggregate
time series employment data in the Province of Quebec22.
Note that the structural parameters could still be identified from
the cross-equation restrictions between (6)" and (7)" even in the absence of
exclusion restrictions.
22 This excess employment variable is constructedby computing the
industry employment for the regular job in excess of usual employment
(employment predicted by estimating an AR1processwith quadratic trend).16
One last variable that is potentially endogenous is the marginal tax
rate -ln(l—r). It can be argued that this variable is much more likely to
be exogenous in an underground than in a regular labor supply equation. The
point is simply that, although the tax rate directly depends on labor
earnings in the regular sector because of the non-proportionality of the tax
and transfer system, it does not directly depend on labor earnings in the
underground sector. On the other hand, the tax rate may still be endogenous
in an underground hours equation to the extent that the hours of work in the
two sectors are jointly determined in our model.
Given these considerations, we will present specifications which assume
that the marginal tax rate is either exogenous or endogenous.In the
empirical model, this variable takes into account the marginal tax rates
associated with the payroll taxes and the federal and provincial income
taxes, as well as the tax-back rates embodied in the social transfer system.
In the case where the marginal tax rate is endogenous, it is instrumented by
a "predicted" tax rate, based on a measure of the predicted gross income in
the regular sector23
Finally, the order condition for the coefficients associated with the
fixed costs equation to be identified is that at least oneexogenous
regressor affects the number of hours worked in the underground sector but
not the fixed costs24. In the empirical section, we will present results for
fixed costs C and reservation underground hours under various assumptions
concerning the choice of the regressor excluded from
23 More precisely,we estimate a reduced form equation for regular
labor income, using as all the exogenous variables of the model as expla-
natory variables, and we construct a measure of predicted labor income. The
marginal tax rate is then computed at that predicted labor income.This
"predicted" tax rate is not equal to the expectation of the tax rate
conditional on the exogenous x's, but it can be used as an instrument for the
actual tax rate, provided that the x's are stochastically independent from
the error terms in (6) and (7)".
24In other words, som; variables included inx1 are not included in
x. Alternatively, identification could be achieved by imposing some
restrictions on the covariance structure of hours and participation.17
4.2 Econometric Methods
Ideally, the generalized Tobit model given by (6)", (7)", (8)', (9),
and (11) should be estimated using a full information maximum likelihood
approach. However, given the complexity of such an approach, we reliedon a
method which provides less efficient though consistent estimatesof the
parameters. The minimum distance approach allows us to take into account the
cross-equation restrictions imposed by the model on the reduced form
equations for underground earnings and hours.Under this approach, the
participation and hours decisions are not estimated simultaneously butusing
a two-step method generalizing Heckman's (1976) approach.
The Minimum Distance Approach
In the first step, the decision on whether to participate or not in the
underground sector is estimated from a discrete choice model based in the
system of equations (7)", (8)', and (9). (Equation (11) is also considered
when W0 is assumed to be endogenous). Assuming that theerror terms are
bivariate normally distributed, the appropriate discrete choice model isa
probit model.A two-stage procedure (see Maddala 1983) is used in the
specifications which assume that the regular wage and the tax rate are
endogenous.
The estimates from the probit are used to construct the inverse Mill's
ratio which allows us to take sample selectivity biases into account in the
regular hours and earnings equations. However, the information contained in
the participation equation is not sufficient to identify the structural
parameters of the model. An appropriate generalization of the second step of
the Heckinan (1976) method is necessary to estimate the structuralparameters
of the model. For our particular application, we need an estimation
procedure which enables us to impose all the cross-equation restrictions
contained in the model.Estimating the structural parameters using the
minimum distance (MD) method (Malinvaud (1980), Chamberlain (1982, 1984)) is18
particularly convenient in this regard, because of the non-linear nature of
the cross-equation restrictions involved in our model.25
Let us specify the restrictions on the parametersof the reduced forts
by the conditions that w —f(,7),where v is the vector of parameters of the
structural form. The MD estimatorof the model minimizes:
—f('i)l'V(y' [ —f(7)]
where denotes the vector of OLS(correctedfor selectivity) estimates of
the reduced form with an estimated covariance matrix given by V(;r). is
consistent end ./N ( —i) isasymptotically normally distributed with mean
zero and variance-covariance matrix (F'V(ffY'F)', where F —äf/3t7and N is
the number of observations.Moreover the minimand from optimal minimum
distance is asymptotically distributed x2(q), where q is the number of
restrictions imposed by the model.It is thus very simple to perform a
specification (or goodness-of-fit) test of our model in this context.
The appropriate reduced form of the model, conditional on working in
the underground sector, depends on whether the regular wage (and the tax
rate) is assumed to be either exogenous or endogenous. In the former case,
the reduced form simply consists of equations (6)" and (7)". In the latter
case, the regular wage equation (11) has to be substituted into (6)" and
(7)".The reduced form of the model thus becomes equation (11) and the
modified versions of (6)" and (7)26•
When the regular wage is endogenous, the sample used to estimate the
model is unbalanced since W01 is observed over the whole sample of people
working in the regular sector, while Y1 and H11 are observed only for those
25 In our context, this method is equivalent to the leastsquares
approach developed by Amemiya (1978, 1979).
26 Note that there could be a fourth reduced formequation for the tax
rate. The true equation for the tax rate is, however, a complicated non-
linear equation (step-function) of regular labor income. We avoided those
complications by simply instrumenting the tax rate with the "predicted" tax
rate in the reduced form equations.19
who work also in the underground sector. One advantage of the MD estimator
is that it is straightforward to implement in the unbalanced sample we are
using, since the reduced form coefficients are sufficient statistics for the
structural parameters.The advantage of using all the observations on the
regular wage is that the estimates of the structural parameters will be more
efficient than if the regular wage equation was only estimated on the sample
of people working in the underground sector.
It is also well known that the residuals in a regression that has been
adjusted for selectivity are heteroskedastic.Once again, it is straight-
forward to incorporate that feature in a MD framework. Chamberlain (1982,
1984) has shown that the optimal minimum distance estimator is more efficient
than three stage least-squares in the presence of heteroskedasticity.
5.Results
Participation Decision
The results of the discrete decision of working in the irregular sector
are shown in Table 3. We have shown in section 4 that the individual i will
work in the irregular sector whenever ln(H) is larger than ln(H'). It is
not possible, however, to identify all the structural parameters associated
with the participation decision from the estimates of a simple probit
The estimates presented in Table 3 should thus be interpreted as
reduced form parameters.
The first column of Table 3 presents estimates from a model in which
both regular wage and marginal tax rate are assumed to be exogenous.The
estimated coefficient associated with the gross regular wage (ln(W0)) is
negative (-0.59) and statistically significant while the coefficient
associated with the marginal tax rate (-log(l—r)) is positive (0.21) and
significant.The sign of the two coefficients is thus consistent with the
27 The probit coefficients are function of all the structuralparame-
ters included in equations (7)", (8)', and possibly (11). They can only be
identified when an hours equation is estimated as well.20
prediction of the model. Note, however, that the effect of the tax rate on
the probability of participating is only a third as large as the effect of
the regular wage. This result is still consistent with our model, provided
that PA is large enough (the results on column I of Table 1 imply an estimate
of .759 for PA),Two other complementary explanations for the result are
that there is some tax illusion, or that the tax rate is measured with error,
perhaps in part because participation rate to the welfare programs s lower
than 100%.As is well known, in the presence of measurement errors the
coefficient of the tax rate will be asymptotically biased toward zero.
The effect of the remaining variables is generally consistent with the
results presented in Table 1 with one notable exception: the age of the
individual increases the probability of working in the irregular sector.
Note also that the estimated coefficients are not affected very much by the
inclusion of industry dummies in column 2.28
The simple probit estimates presented in column 1 and 2 are inconsistent
when the regular wage and the tax rate are endogenous. In columns 3 and 4,
we present the two-stage probit version of the simple probits of column 1 and
2 which are consistent even when the regular wage rate and the implicit
marginal tax rate are endogenous. Excluded instrumental variables in column
3 are the union status, the "predicted" tax rate and the industry dummies.
For the model presented in column 4, the industry dummies are directly
included in the probit equation instead of being used as instruments29. The
two-stage procedure invariably increases the magnitude of the estimated
coefficients associated with the regular wage and the marginal tax rate.
The estimated standard errors increase even more in percentage, so that the
28 To avoid perfectcollinearity among the regressors, only 1-2
industry dummies are included on the right hand side of the equation (I is
the number of industries). This follows from the fact that a constant and the
excess employment in the industry, which is a linear combination of the
industry dummies, are already included. This also explains why the coeffi-
cients associated with the excess employment variable become much larger (in
absolute terms) when the industry dummies are included on the right-hand side
of the equation.
29 In column 5, the unionstatus is also used as an instrumental
variable for the sake of comparison with the specification used in Table 4.21
estimated coefficients are not statistically different from zero anymore.
For similar reasons, Hausman-type specification tests do not reject the
specifications of column 1 and 2. which suggests that the regular wage and
the implicit marginal tax rate are exogenous30.
In the probit model, the standard error of the error term is always
normalized to one. As a consequence, we cannot directly test the hypothesis
that the concavity coefficient 6 belongs to the ]O,l[ interval, as the Cobb-
Douglas specification would imply.Furthermore, the simple probit estimates
and the two-stage probit estimates are not strictly comparable to each other
since they are normalized by different factors31.Later in the section we
will present some estimates that do not depend on these implicit normaliza-
tions by exploiting the cross-equation restrictions between the participation
equation and the irregular hours (and earnings) equation.
Minimum Distance Estimates
In Table 4, we present estimates of the two central equations of our
model: the irregular earnings equation (6)" and the irregular hours equation
(7)". The MD technique enables us to estimate those two equations independ-
ently or jointly, when the regular wage (and the tax rate) are either
endogenous or exogenous.
Column 1 presents single-equation estimates of the irregular earnings
function in which the regular wage and the tax rate are not instrumented. In
that particular case, MD is equivalent to estimating the irregular earnings
equation using Heckman's two-step procedure. One problem with the results is
that the estimated value of 9 (-.350)is inconsistent with the Cobb-Douglas
30Thevalue of the specification text statistics are .187 —(2)and
.574 —(l)respectively.
31Theproblem is that the two-stage estimates arenormalizedby a
factor that includes the variance of W-4, where W is the variable that is
being instrumented while V is the instrument that is used (predicted value
for V from the first-stage).This is hardly surprising since it is well
known that applying the standard OLS formula to the second stage of standard
two-stage least squares produces inconsistent estimates of the standard error
of the estimated coefficients.22
functional form for irregular earnings. Column 2 presents estimates of the
same earnings equation when the regular wage and the tax rate are instru-
mented by the set of industry dummies and by the "predicted" tax rate. The
estimated value of 9 is now positive and equal to .486.Furthermore, one
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the model of column 1 is misspecified
(Hausman test statistic of 7.79 —
Column3 and 4 present similar specifications for the irregular hours
equation. The results presented in column 3 are thus similar to the
estimates of the irregular hours equation that we would obtain using
Heckman's two-step procedure. Note that the estimated value of 9 is negative
(-1.286) as it was the case in column 1.Column 4 shows that, once again, 9
becomes positive (.384) when the regular wage and the tax rate are instru-
mented.9 is estimated very imprecisely, however, and the null hypothesis
that the model of column 3 is misspecified can now be rejected (Hausman test
statistic of 0.49 —2(2)).Note also that for all the specifications
considered, the estimated effect of the marginal tax rate has the wrong sign
but is never statistically significant.
The three final columns of Table 4 show the results obtained when the
irregular earnings and the irregular hours equations are estimated simul-
taneously, i.e. when the cross-equation restrictions implied by the model are
imposed on those two equations. Column 5 presents the uninstrumented version
of the model.The estimated value of 9 is negative (-.456)while the
goodness-of-fit statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the cross-equation
restrictions embodied in equation (6)" and (7)" are valid (35.94 —
Bothof those results might simply reflect the fact that the estimated
coefficients are inconsistent because the regular wage and the tax rate are
endogenous. The evidence that follows supports that conjecture.
Column 6 presents estimates from a model in which industry dummies, the
union status, and the "predicted" tax rate are used to instrument the regular
wage and the implicit marginal tax rate.In column 7, the union status is
included on the right hand side of the irregular earnings and hours equations
instead.In both cases, the estimated value of 9 is increased while the
goodness-of-fit test statistic is essentially equal to its critical value at23
a 95% significance level (36.04 —2(24)_36.42and 35.97 —2(23),35l7)
Note that for the models of column 6 and 7, the goodness-of-fit statistic is
a joint test of the validity of the overidentification restrictions (varia-
bles only included in the regular wage equation) and of the cross-equation
restrictions between the irregular earnings and the irregular hours equation.
One reason why the goodness-of-fit test does not tend to reject the model
when the regular wage and the tax rate are instrumented is that the estimated
value of 6 in column 2 and 4 (regular wage and tax rate instrumented) are
much closer to each other than in column 1 and 3 (regular wage and tax rate
not instrumented). More formally, the null hypothesis that the estimates of
Oand implied by the irregular earnings equation are different from those
implied by the irregular hours equation is tested using a Lagrange multiplier
type test.For the model presented in column7,the value of the LM test
statistic is 1.52 —2(lO),which suggests that the restrictions embodied in
equation (6)" and (7)" are valid when the endogeneity of the regular wage and
of the implicit tax rate is properly treated in the estimation procedure32.
This suggest that the goodness of fit statistic in column 7 (and 6)
mostly reflect the large value of the overidentification test statistic for
the irregular earnings equation (25.36).Finally, the null hypothesis that
the regular wage and the tax rate are exogenous is strongly rejected (Hausman
test statistic of 64.39 —x2(2)).We conclude from the results presented in
Table 4 that our model gives a relatively accurate representation of the
covariance structure of irregular earnings, irregular hours, and of the
regular wage.Furthermore, the number of hours worked in the irregular
sector is very responsive to changes in the wage in the regular sector. Thus
the estimates of the gross regular wage elasticity vary between -1.62 and
-3.02 (see the penultimate row of Table 4), when only the results consistent
with our Cobb-Douglas specification are retained.
One disappointing feature of the results is the absence of a systematic
effect of the marginal tax rate on the number of hours worked in the
irregular sector (last row of Table 4).We have already mentioned many
The test is not very powerful, however, since the instrumented
version of the hours equation is very imprecisely estimated.24
reasons why the tax rate should have a smaller effect on irregular hours
than the gross regular wage. One further possibility is that people who face
higher tax rates arid thus higher expected penalties if they get caught,
ceteris paribus, are more likely to underreport (in the questionnaire) the
number of hours they work in the irregular sector33. On the other hand, they
might still be willing to admit that they did some work in the irregular
sector.
We thus conclude that it is still valuable to use the estimated effect
of the marginal tax rate on the probability of working in the irregular
sector to infer how irregular hours respond to changes in the implicit
marginal tax rate.Two identifying assumptions are required to do this.
First, the MD estimates of ,thevector of coefficients associated to the
exogenous variables x11 ,mustbe consistent. Second, as discussed in section
4, at least one exogenous variable included in x11 must not influence the
fixed cost of working in the irregular sector.It is then possible to
identify 0 and a1 from the probit coefficients and the MD estimates of
From those estimates, it is easy to construct measures of the elasticity of
irregular hours with respect to the regular wage and the marginal tax rate
which are implied by the probit estimates of the participation decision.
Estimates of Elasticities Based on the Participation Decision
Table 5 presents estimates of the elasticity of irregular hours with
respect to the regular wage that are implied by the probit estimates of the
Greenberg and Halsey (1983) have documented a similar phenomenon in
the context of the SIME-DIME negative income tax experiments.
In general, the estimated value of S and obtained with that
procedure are different from the MD estimates of 8 and a1. Many consistent
estimates of the sameparameters can be computed because the system of
participation,irregular earnings and irregular hours equations is overidentified.25
participation decision.35 Similar elasticities of irregular hours with
respect to the marginal tax rate are also presented. The elasticities are
computed under various assumptions regarding which variables should be
excluded from the fixed costs function. Compared to the reduced form probit
estimates presented in Table 3, one advantage of the structural estimates is
that they are not sensitive to the different normalization used for the
simple probit and the two-stage probit.One drawback of the structural
estimates is that they have to rely on relatively arbitrary exclusion
restrictions.
The estimates of the elasticity of irregular hours with respect to the
regular wage presented in Table 5 are of the same order of magnitude as the
estimates obtained with MD when the regular wage and the tax rate are
instrumented.On the other hand, the elasticity of irregular hours with
respect to the tax rate is now always positive. This reflects the fact that
the tax rate always has a positive and significant effect on the probability
of working in the irregular sector. Significant estimates (at the 10 percent
level) of this elasticity range between 0.62 and 0.96, depending on the
specification considered. It should be noted that the estimates are
substantially larger when the regular wage and the implicit marginal tax rate
are instrumented.
Table 6 provides estimates of fixed costs of working and of reservation
hours in the irregular sector that are implied by the uninstrumented
estimates of Table 3 and 4.Fixed costs are of the order of an average of
several hundred dollars, while the average individual working in the
irregular sector earns more than two thousand dollars from irregular labor
market activities.
Call that estimate of theta $ while the estimate obtained from the
irregular hours (or earnings) is .Forsimplicity, assume that x is a
single variable and that is does not affect fixed costs. Finally, ignore the
tax rate for the moment. The irregular hours and the latent participation
equations can be written as:
ln(H) —aln(W0)+ +
(ln(H1)—ln(H'))/c —bln(W01)+ bx1 +
where: or2Var(p ),a—-l/(l—8),a1—fl/(l—8), b_/c79(l—6). It
then follows tat Oh—(aW+l)/a, and that a1 can be
estimated in a similar way.26
Conclusion
In this paper, a model of labor supply in the underground economy was
developed and estimated.The theoretical model relied on the empirical
observation that earnings in the underground sector seems to be a concave
function of hours worked in the underground sector. By contrast, evidence
suggests that the gross wage rate in the regular sector is parametric. Those
two features of the model were shown to generate a separation result between
preferences and the number of hours worked in the underground sector. The
discrete decision of working in the underground sector was also modelled by
introducing some fixed money costs of participating in the underground
economy.
The model was estimated over a micro data set collected in the region of
Quebec City, Canada. Conditional on working in the underground sector,
cross-equation restrictions on the reduced form parameters were imposed using
a Minimum Distance procedure. The results obtained were generally consistent
with the model.In particular, we find a negative and often significant
effect of the gross wage in the regular sector on both the decision of
participating and the number of hours worked in the underground sector. We
also find that the marginal tax rate has a positive and often significant
effect on the probability of working in the underground sector.
On the other hand, the estimates of the effect of the marginal tax rate
on hours of work, as estimated from our minimum distance approach, have the
wrong sign but are never significant.One possible explanation is that
individuals who face higher marginal tax rates are more likely to underreport
(in the questionnaire) their hours of work in the underground sector, since
they are also likely to face higher penalty rate on their underground labor
income. However, one can argue that they may still be ready to declare that
they participated in the underground sector. Our results suggest that this
is the case since the estimates of the tax rate elasticity of hours worked in
the underground sector, as obtained from the participation equations, are
positive.Significant estimates (at the 10 percent level) of the latter
elasticity range between 0.62 and 0.96, depending on the specification
considered. All-in-all, our results suggest that the marginal tax rates
embodied in the Quebec tax-transfer system are an important determinant of
the labor supply in the underground economy.27
References
Alexander, Craig and Jonathan S. Feinstein "A Microeconometric Analysis of
Income Tax Evasion", Mimeo, MIT Department of Economics, April 1987.
Aniemiya, Takeshi "The Estimation Of Simultaneous Equation Generalized
Probit." Econometrics 47 (September 1978): 1193-1205.
Amemiya, Takeshi "The Estimation Of a Simultaneous Equation Tobit Model."
International Economic Review 20 (February 1979): 169-181.
Baidry, Jonathan C."Tax Evasion and Labor Supply." Economics Letters 3
(1979): 53-56.
Chamberlain, Gary "Multivariate Regression Models for Panel Data." Journal
of Econometrics 18 (January 1982): 5-46.
Chamberlain, Gary "Panel Data." In Zvi Criliches and Michael Intrilligator,
eds. The Handbook of Econometrics Vol. 2. New York: North Holland,
1984.
Clotfelter, Charles T."TaxEvasionand TaxRates."Review of Econ. and
Stat. 65 (August 1983): 363-373.
Cogan, John "Labor Supply with Costs of Labor Market Entry." in J.P. Smith
(ed.) Female Labor Supply: Theory and Estimation. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1980.
Cowell, Frank "Tax Evasion with Labour Income." Journal of Public Economics
26 (February 1985): 19-34.
Cowell, Frank and James Gordon "On Becoming a Ghost: Indirect Tax Evasion
and Government Audit Policy." London School of Economics Discussion
Paper TIDI/l27, January 1989.
Fluet, Claude"Fraude Fiscale et Offre de Travail au Noir."Actualité
Economique 63 (June-September 1987): 225-242.
Fortin, Bernard and Pierre Fréchette"The Size and determinants of The
Underground Economy in Quebec." Miméo, Université Laval, 1987.
Ginsburgh, Victor, Sergio Perelman and Pierre Pestieau "Le travail au noir."
In V. Cinsburgh and P. Pestieau eds. L'économie informelle. Bruxelles:
Editions Labor, 1987.
Greenberg, David and Harlan Halsey "Systematic Misreporting and Effects of
Income Maintenance Experiments on Work Effort: Evidence from the
Seattle-Denver Experiment."Journal of Labor EconomIcs 4 (October
1983): 380-407.28
Gronau, Reuben"Leisure, Home Production, and Work -theTheory of the
Allocation of Time Revisited." Journal of Political Economy 85
(December 1977): 1099-1123.
Harisson, Ingemar "Tax Evasion and Government Policy". In W. Caertner and A.
Wenig eds., The Economics of the Shadow Econooxy.Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 1985.
Hausmart, Jerry"Taxes and Labor Supply." In A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein
eds. Handbook of Public Finance. New York: North Holland, 1985.
Heckman, James"The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation,
Sample Selection, and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator
for such models." Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 5 (Fall
1976): 475-492.
Isachsen, A.J. ,S.0.Samuelsen and S. Strom "The Behaviour of Tax Evaders."
In U. Gaertner and A. Wenig, eds.The Economics of the Shadow Economy.
Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1985.
Kesselman, Jonathan R."Income Tax Evasion:An Intersectoral Analysis."
Journal of Public Economics (March 1989): 137-182.
Lemieux, Thomas. An Econometric Analysis of labor Supply in the Irregular
Economy. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, October
1989.
Lewis, Gregg. Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1986.
Maddala, CS. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Malinvaud, Edmond.Statistical Methods of Econometrics, Amsterdam: North
Holland, 1980.
Pencavel, John H. "A Note on Income Tax Evasion, Labor Supply, and Nonlinear
Tax Schedules." Journal of Public Economics 12 (August 1979): 115-124.
Pestieau, Pierre "Belgium's Irregular Economy." In U. Caertner and A Wenig,
eds. The Economics of the Shadow Economy. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1985.
Rosen, Harvey"Taxes in a Labor Supply Model with Joint Wage-Hours Deter-
mination." Economecrica 44 (May 1976): 485-507.
Sandmo, Agar "Income Tax Evasion, Labour Supply, and the Equity-Efficiency
Tradeoff." Journal of Public Economics 12 (December 1981): 131-149.
Sleznrod, Joel"An Empirical Test for Tax Evasion." Review of Econ. and
Stat. 67 (May 1985): 232-238.
Usher, Dan"Tax Evasion and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds." Economic
Inquiry 4 (October 1986): 563-586.29
Van Eck, Robert and Brugt Kazemier •Features of the Hidden Economy in the
Netherlands." Review of Income andWealth34 (September 1988): 251-273.
Watson, Harry "Tax Evasion and Labor Markets." JournalofPublic Economics
27 (July 1985): 231-246.
Yitzhaki, Shiomo "Income Tax Evasion: A Note." Journalof Public Economics
































2107100.0 8.7 360 2171
1026 48.7 10.0 338 2627
1081 51.3 7.5 391 1564
323 15.3 23.8 349 2137
907 43.1 8.5 370 2055











94 4.5 16.0 522 1872











669 31.8 9.4 374 2442
320 15.2 15.6 236 1639
355 16.9 8.2 306 1664
Labor market
status
Student 241 11.4 28.6 332 1976
Retired 107 5.1 1.9 120 500
Housekeeper 370 17.6 6.8 581 2216
Unemployed 84 4.0 28.6 310 2459
Worker 1305 61.9 4.9 369 2068
Social assistance 103 4.9 35.0 468 3491
claimant
Regular income
842 40.0 14.7 428 2274 0-10000
10000-20000 425 20.2 7.3 236 1975
20000-30000 339 16.1 4.4 282 2167
30000-40000 222 1.0.5 3.2 98 1729
40000+ 279 13.2 2.5 94 1575Notes: 1/
2/
Everybody reporting an irregular job.


































Finance, insurance152 10.6 2.0 217 2462
Services 454 31.5 8.6 249 1370
Public administ. 312 21.7 5.5 154 1674
Industry on the
-- -• 1.9 250 1414
irregular lob
Unclassified













Finance -- -- 0.6 403 3065





Partial covariances, i.e. covariances controlling for sex, •ducation,
experience and experience squared, are in parentheses. The subsample used
to compute the covariances among the variables related to the regular
(reep. irregular) sector includes all the persons who vorked in the
regular (resp. irregular) sector. In the case of the covariances among
the variables of both the regular and the irregular sector, the subsample
















































-0.217 0.410 0.193 0.902 0.280 1.182
(-0.225) (0.224) (-0.001) (0.838) (0.172) (1.010)TA3LE 3:PARTICIPATION EQUATIONS
(Consistent estimates of standard errors are in parentheses).
predictedN marginal tax rate. Standard errors adjusted for the two-stage
procedure.
2Excludedinstrumental variables: union status and predicted implicit
marginal tax rate. Standard errors adjusted for the two-stage procedure.
Union status included amongthe regressors.













































































































































1 Excludedinstrumental variables: union status, industry
-302.8
1390
dummiesandTABLE 4: MINIMUM DISTANCE ESTIMATION1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Equations
Fitted: Y1 Y1,W0 H1 H1,W0 Y1 ,H1Y1,H1,W0Y1,H1,W0
Excluded
Instruments: --- 3',D--- P,t) --- 3',D,U 3',D
Curvature -0.350 0.486 -1.286 0.384 -0.456 0.655 0.670
Parameter(0) (0.394) (0.281) (1.482) (1.536)(0.419) (0.088) (0.103)
0.707 1.553 1.208 1.226 1.042 1.203 1.185
(0463) (0.681) (0.276) (0.599) (0.062) (0.120) (0.135)
Irreg. Mict
Productivity ($)
Age 0.018 -0.002 -0.117 -0.040 0.122 0.040 0.042
(0.173)(0.079) (0.327) (0.374) (0.171)(0.044) (0.043)
Sex Dummy -0.444 -0.132 0.260 0.059 -0.884 -0.233 -0.234
(female—i) (0.423) (0.145) (0.863) (0.902) (0.436) (0.081) (0.078)
Experience 0.090 0.065 0.200 0.092 0.063 0.047 0.046
in Reg. Mkt(0.080) (0.033) (0.172) (0.201) (0.079) (0.018) (0.018)
Education -0.153 0.011 -0.091 0.042-0.096 0.025 0.027
(0.087) (0.041) (0,158) (0.122)(0.078) (0.021) (0.021)
Union -0.343 -0.074 -0.382 0.058-0.748 0.023
Status (0.396) (0.189) (0.847) (0.609)(0.476) (0.085)
Marital Stat. -0.459 -0.287 0.111 0.290-0.995 -0.199 -0.190
(married—i)(0.506) (0.232) (1.021) (0.967)(0.588) (0.113) (0.115)
Excess Empi. -15.222-8.353 -17.027-4.975 -22.420-5.397-5.306
in Industry(9.246) (4.330) (17.339) (15.990)(9.877) (1.962) (1.934)
Regular Wage ('y)
Sex Dummy --- -0.141 --- -0.145 --- -0.147-0.146
(female—i) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Experience --- 0.030 --- 0.030 --- 0.030 0.030
in Reg. Mkt (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Education -- - 0.071 0.071 --- 0.071 0.071
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Union --- 0.140 --- 0.143 --- 0.148 0.136
Status (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.023)
Goodn.-of-Fjt: 0 25.39 0 2.03 35.94 36.02 35.95
D. of Freedom: (0) (6) (0) (6) (10) (24) (23)
Other regressors included in and -are:constant, age squared,
experience squared.Age, marriage and industry dummies (D) are also
included in .
Otherinstruments used are the union status (U) and 3'—-ln(l-,) where is
the "predicted" marginal tax rate.
Consistent estimates of standard errors are in parentheses.TABLE 4(contthuation)
Elasticity of Hours in the Irregular Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
£quattons
Fitted: Y1,W0 H1 Y1.H1Y11H1,W0 Y1,H1,WQ
Excluded
Instruzents: ---
CrossReg.Wage -0.741-1.947 -0.437 -1.624 -0.687 -2.897-3.029
Elasticity (0.216) (1.065) (0.284) (4.049) (0.198) (0.737) (0.948)
Tax Rate 0.217 -1.076 -0.091 -0.367 -0.029 -0.589-0.560
Elasticity: (0.383) (0.792) (0.l5) (0.432) (0.044) (0.298) (0.319)TABLE 5







Consistentstandard errors are in parentheses.
TABLE 6
FIXEDCOSTSAND CRITICAL HOURS AT TUE



























Based on calculations from Table 3,
2Basedon calculations from Table 3,
Based on calculations from Table 3,
column 1, and Table 4, column 5.
column 3, and Table 4, column 7.
















Regular Wage and Taxes
Instrumented2
Theta Wage Tax
Elast. Elast.
(8) (9) (10)
0.404 1.678 0.845
J.244) (0.551)
0.759 4.149 2.090
(4.762) (2.434)
0.475 1.905 0.960
(0.258) (0.560)I
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